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I. STATEMENTOFTHECASE 
Respondent offers the following statement of this case to the extent that it disagrees with 
or supplements the history offered by the Appellants, pursuant to Rule 35(b)(3) of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
A. Nature of the Case 
The nature of this matter revolves around Appellants' claim for attorney fees in an 
arbitration proceeding. Appellants, Sam and Deva Ferrell ("Ferrells"), filed an uninsured 
motorist claim pursuant to their commercial auto policy. The policy was issued by United 
Financial Casualty Company ("United Financial"). United Financial settled and paid all of the 
claims submitted by the Ferrells with the exception of the wage loss claim prior to the initiation 
of arbitration. The lost wage claim was disputed. The Ferrells demanded arbitration under the 
Arbitration Clause of the insurance policy. The claim was arbitrated in November of2010 and an 
award given. Ferrells filed a Petition for Confirmation of the arbitration award and requested 
attorney fees and costs. An order was issued by the District Court awarding costs to the Ferrells 
but not attorney fees. Upon reconsideration the Court again determined the F errells were not 
entitled to attorney fees. Also, upon reconsideration, the Court reversed its decision regarding 
costs and held that each party should bear their own costs in accordance with the arbitration 
agreement between the parties. 
1- RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
B. Procedural History 
The Ferrells first notified United Financial of their wage loss through a letter dated July 
9, 2009. R. p. 011. The Ferrells formally demanded payment of their wage loss claim and 
provided documentation of their losses by letter dated December 22, 2009. R. p. 012. 
United Financial tendered payment of the undisputed amount of wage loss on January 5, 
2010. R. p. 014. 
Without filing suit, the Ferrells demanded arbitration pursuant to the uninsured motorist 
provision of their policy by letter dated January 22, 2010. R. p. 019. 
The arbitration hearing was conducted on November 4, 2010. Each party had previously 
designated their respective arbitrator and had jointly agreed on a third arbitrator. The arbitrators 
awarded lost wages in favor of the Ferrells and specifically found that no lawsuit had been filed 
prior to demanding arbitration. R. p. 020. United Financial sent payment in full per the award on 
November 19, 2010 as provided for in Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Reconsider. R. p. 148. 
On January 3, 2011, United Financial filed a motion to stay the proceedings to allow the 
Arbitration panel to address the issue of costs and fees. R. p. 021. The panel declined to address 
the issue of costs and fees, and the Motion to Stay was withdrawn. R. p. 031. 
United Financial filed its Answer to the Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award 
and Award of Costs and Fees on February 17, 2011. R. p. 033. 
The Ferrells filed a Motion for Fees and Costs on March 11, 2011. R. p. 040. United 
Financial filed Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs on March 24, 
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2011. R. p. 068. United Financial also filed the relevant portion of the insurance policy by 
Affidavit of Defendants' Counsel on April 6, 2011. R. p. 088. The matter was heard before the 
District Court on April6, 2011. Tr. Pp. 11-40. The court issued its Memorandum Decision and 
Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs in which it denied the F errells attorney fees, but, it did 
award costs to the Ferrells. The decision failed to consider the insurance policy and ruled that 
Rule 54 governed the costs. R. p. 107. 
Both parties moved to reconsider and filed responding briefs and affidavits. R. pp. 120-
69. The court heard these motions on June 8, 2011. Tr. pp. 41-56. The District Court issued its 
decision that the Ferrells were not entitled to attorney fees. R. pp. 179-83. The court further 
reversed its previous award of costs because the insurance policy specifically designates that 
each party should bear the burden of their respective costs and the policy was controlling on this 
issue. R. pp. 183-84. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. The District Court properly applied Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and the common law 
in denying the Ferrells' request for attorney fees. 
2. The Ferrells should not be awarded costs because the controlling language is 
found in the insurance policy. 
3. Ferrells' request for attorney fees and cost on appeal should be denied. 
III.STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal for attorney fees is based on the application ofldaho Code§ 41-1839. The 
interpretation of a statute is a question oflaw over which the court exercises free review. 
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Harrison v. Binnion, 14 7 Idaho 645, 214 P .3d 631 (2009). It must begin with the literal words of 
the statute. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002). 
The matter of reviewing an award of costs pursuant to arbitration requires the 
interpretation of the Uniform Arbitration Act. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
subject to free review. Harrison, 147 Idaho at 649, 214 P.3d at 635. The Uniform Arbitration Act 
can be found in Title 7, chapter 9 of the Idaho Code. An evaluation of the statutes in question 
must determine the literal words; those words must be given the plain, usual and ordinary 
meaning. Id. If the language is not ambiguous, the court must simply follow the law. Id. (quoting 
McLean v. Maverick Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006)). 
IV.ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court properly applied I.C. § 41-1839 in this action. 
The District Court held that the Ferrells are not allowed to recover under I.C. § 41·1 
as it existed at the time of arbitration. At the time the Ferrells initiated arbitration, § 41 ~ 1839 
provided as follows: 
ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY FEES IN SUITS AGAINST 
INSURERS. (1) Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or 
contract of insurance, surety, guaranty or indemnity of any kind or 
nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a period of thirty (30) days 
after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in such policy, 
certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the 
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in 
any action thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this 
state for recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or 
contract, pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge 
reasonable as attorney's fees in such action. 
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LC. § 41-1839(1) (emphasis added) (effective until July 1, 2010). As the Ferrells noted in their 
brief, the statute was subsequently amended, and the revised statute became effective on July 1, 
2010. Appellants' Brief p. 8 ("A. Brief'). This was six months after the Ferrells demanded 
arbitration. The District Court recognized the amendment and the possible effect it would have 
on this action in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs. R. p. 109. 
United Financial argued against the application of the amended statute and the District Court 
agreed. 
1. § 41-1839, as amended, cannot be retrospectively applied. 
The Ferrells incorrectly claim that § 41-1839 should be applied retrospectively to this 
action. The Ferrells appeal to public policy and the legislative statement of purpose in hopes that 
they will sway the court. A. Brief p. 8-9, 11. However, both arguments fail to cite authority on 
which they rely. More importantly, the statute and statement of purpose lacked retrospective 
language or reference that the legislature intended the amended statute to apply retroactively. 
United Financial argued against the application of the amended statute retrospectively. 
support of this argument, United Financial offered Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 753 P.2d 
296 (Ct. App. 1988), as instructive on this issue. Tr. p. 26, L. 12-17. The District Court agreed 
with United Financial and provided an extensive and persuasive analysis on why the amended 
statute should not apply retrospectively. R. p. 110-12. The Court cited Myers, wherein the Idaho 
Court of Appeals provided clarification regarding retrospective application of amended statutes 
as follows: 
Unless a contrary legislative intent appears on the face of a statute, 
retrospective application is disfavored. I. C. § 73-101. See also 
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University of Utah Ho~pital v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 657 P.2d 469 
(1982). An application is deemed retrospective if it affects 
substantive rights. City of Garden City v. City of Boise, 1 04 Idaho 
512, 660 P.2d 1355 (1983). Among the rights characterized as 
substantive are those which are "contractual or vested" in nature. 
Id. at 515, 660 P.2d at 1358. Statutes which do not "create, enlarge, 
diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights" are deemed to be 
remedial or procedural, as opposed to substantive. !d. They may be 
applied retrospectively. 
When this classification scheme is applied to statutes authorizing 
discretionary awards of attorney fees, such statutes generally are 
held to be remedial or procedural. Consequently, they are given 
retroactive effect. See, e.g., Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Public 
Utilities Commission, 113 Idaho 959, 751 P.2d 107 (1988) 
(applying I.C. § 61-617A); Jensen v. Shank, 99 Idaho 565, 585 
P.2d 1276 (1978) (applying I.C. § 12-121). Presumably, any 
amendment to such statutes also would receive retrospective effect. 
However, we think a different analysis is required for I.C. § 12-
120. Unlike I.C. §§ 12-121 and 61-617A, I.C. § 12-120 provides 
for a mandatory, not discretionary, award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party in commercial litigation. The automatic nature of 
an award under I.C. § 12-120 makes it, in effect, an adjunct to the 
underlying commercial agreement between the parties. It 
establishes an entitlement. In this respect, an award under the 
statute is closely akin to other "contractual or vested" rights 
contained in the agreement itself. Although the award right is 
"remedial" in the semantic sense that it relates to a remedy, the 
same could be said of contract provisions relating to damages or 
other relief in the event of default. 
Accordingly, we think that the 1986 amendment to I.C. § 12-120, 
which enlarged the scope of entitlement to mandatory attorney fee 
awards, is more accurately classified as substantive than as merely 
remedial or procedural. Consequently, the 1986 amendment should 
not be given retroactive effect. 
!d. at 87, 753 P.2d at 298. 
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In an Addendum on Petitions for Rehearing in Howard v. Blue Cross of idaho Health 
Service, Inc., 114 Idaho 485, 757 P.2d 1204 (Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals stated the 
following regarding its decision in Myers: 
We also noted in Myers that a mandatory fee-shifting statute 
produces a harsh result for the non-prevailing party whose claim or 
defense is meritorious but unsuccessfuL Such a result can be 
deemed fair only if the operation of the statute is known in 
advance and the parties are able to guide their litigation 
decisions accordingly. See DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106 
Idaho 288, 293, 678 P.2d 80, 85 (Ct. App. 1984). We concluded in 
Myers that "a retrospective application of the 1986 amendment to 
I.C. § 12-120 would distort this decision-making process. It would 
profoundly alter --after the fact-- the costs and benefits of 
submitting a meritorious (albeit disputed) claim to the courts for 
resolution." 
!d. at 493-94,757 P.2d at 1212-13. (Emphasis added) 
The court of appeals again discussed Myers in Eriksen v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health 
Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 693, 778 P.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1989). The court stated: 
In Myers, we drew a line against application of I.C. § 12-120(3) to 
suits filed prior to the 1986 amendment because the parties in such 
cases had no opportunity to weigh the risk of exposure to 
mandatory fee awards before deciding to litigate. That is not so 
here. Although the insurance policy was issued prior to the 1986 
amendment, the application of the attorney fee provision was 
triggered only by the commencement of litigation after the 
amendment had become effective. Thus, unlike the parties in 
Myers, the parties in this case were aware of the attorney fee risk 
when they chose to litigate. Moreover, we note that our Supreme 
Court has adopted the risk-weighing rationale of Myers. See 
Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989). We conclude 
that an attorney fee award was authorized by LC. § 12-120(3) in 
this case. 
!d. at 695-96, 778 P .2d at 817-18. 
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Myers and its progeny show that statutes authorizing mandatory awards of attorney's fees 
are substantive in nature. Because § 12-120 "more closely resembles a substantive right than a 
merely procedural right," the courts refused retrospective application. United Financial had a 
meritorious defense because the arbitration award for wage loss was significantly less than the 
Ferrells' demand. R. p. 12 (Demand Letter); R. p. 20 (Award Decision). Applying the reasoning 
of Myers to this case; application of the law retrospectively would subject United Financial to a 
harsh result when it had a proven meritorious defense. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated the attorney fee provision of§ 41 183 9 is "not a 
penalty but is an additional sum rendered as compensation when the insured is entitled to recover 
under the insurance policy, 'to prevent the sum therein provided from being diminished by 
expenditures for the services of an attorney .... "' Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 
Idaho 244,247,61 P.3d 601, 604 (2002). "[T]he provisions ofi.C. § 41-1839 become part ofthe 
insurance contract to the same effect as though incorporated therein." Pendlebury v. Western 
Casualty & Sur. Co., 89 Idaho 456, 406 P.2d 129 (1965). Section 41-1839(1) states the insurer 
"shall" pay attorney's fees if specific conditions are met. Thus, the right to collect attorney's fees 
under§ 41-1839(1) is analogous to other vested rights in the underlying contract. Section 41-
1839(1) is similar to § 12-120 in that it mandates an attorney fee award rather than simply 
authorizing a discretionary award. R. p. 112. 
The Supreme Court found in Grease Spot, "there is no language indicating that § 41-1839 
is meant to imply a provision for arbitration attorney fees into every insurance policy." Grease 
Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 226 P.3d 524,528 (2010). The amendment to§ 41-1839 
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provided a substantive change to its prior version to include mandatory attorney fees in 
arbitration. 
The District Court properly concluded the entitlement to a mandatory award under § 41-
1839(1) was a substantive right. This substantive right was found in both the original and 
amended versions for lawsuits; however, the amended statute made attorney fees more broadly 
available to include arbitration. The Court went on to say that: 
R. p. 112. 
The amendment did not change the right to collect attorney's fees 
from discretionary to mandatory. As a result, this Court believes it 
is appropriate to consider whether retrospective application would 
be proper if "the operation of the statute [was] known in advance 
and the parties [were] able to guide their litigation decisions 
accordingly." Cf Howard, at 493-94, 757 P.2d at 1212-13. In other 
words, if [United Financial] had the "opportunity to weigh the risk 
of exposure to mandatory fee awards before deciding to 
[arbitrate]," then retrospective application of § 41-1839 may be 
proper. Cf Eriksen, 116 Idaho at 695-96, 778 P.2d at 817-18. 
The application of respective mandatory attorney fees under § 41-1839 in arbitration 
alters a substantive right. The statute should not be used to award attorney fees in this case 
because United Financial did not have a fair opportunity to weigh the risk of exposure to 
mandatory fee awards in arbitration before deciding to arbitrate. 
2. Filing suit prior to arbitration was required for§ 41-1839 to apply to this 
action. 
For § 41-1839 to apply to this action, the Ferrells were required to file suit prior to 
arbitration. The District Court agreed and provided support through a valid and thorough analysis 
of Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.4d 601 (2002) and Barbee v. 
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WMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657 (2006). R. p. 113-15. The Court properly 
recognized that Barbee was the more recent precedent, that it more directly analyzed the 
applicable issues, and that it was controlling for purposes of the Court's decision. 
The Ferrells apparently like the language in Martin and do not like the language in 
Barbee. So the Ferrells request that this Court rely on the older, less on-point, and non-
controlling case language. To make such argument, the Ferrells assert that Martin has never 
been formally overruled. 
Once again, the District Court appropriately addressed the Ferrells' position in its 
decisions. For clarification on the issue, the language found in Barbee does explicitly reference 
Martin and refutes the Ferrells' argument. According to Barbee: 
The issue of whether this statute supports a suit solely for attorney 
fees filed after an arbitration award assigning damages has been 
fully paid is a matter of first impression for Idaho courts. For 
guidance, the parties refer this Court to many cases involving I.C. 
§ 41-1839, a somewhat analogous statute that allows a claimant to 
recover attorney fees under certain circumstances in suits against 
insurers. See Emery v. United P. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 
442 (1991); Wolfe [v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co.], 128 Idaho 398, 913 
P.2d 1168 [1996]; Martin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. 
Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 (2002); American Foreign Ins. 
Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P .3d 699 (2004). While the 
Bentleys [plaintiffs] argue these cases indicate a party may bring a 
separate lawsuit after arbitration simply to recover attorney fees, 
we are not persuaded. The common thread flowing through these 
cases is that attorney fees were awarded where the insured was 
involved in a lawsuit before he or she received the amount justly 
due-their damages-from the insurance company. Here, WMA 
timely paid the arbitration award. The Bentleys were not involved 
in a lawsuit before they received their damages from WMA. 
Consequently, to the extent cases interpreting I.C. § 41-1839 apply 
by analogy, the Bentleys are not entitled to file a separate lawsuit 
solely for attorney fees. 
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Furthermore, a fair reading of I.C. § 60-1446 indicates there is no 
independent cause of action for attorney tees. Under the statute, a 
claimant is entitled to sue for consideration paid, together with 
interest, costs and tees. There is no basis tor simply filing a lawsuit 
to collect attorney fees when the principal amount claimed has 
been fully paid and resolved in another proceeding. 
146 P .3d at 661 (italics in original; underlined emphasis added; bracketed language added to 
complete citations and to identify party status). 
Stated simply, the Barbee court recognized that Emery, Wolfe, Martin, and American 
Foreign Insurance together indicate that a previous lawsuit to pursue the underlying claim tor 
damages was a critical requirement for a subsequent request for attorney fees. 146 P.3d at 66L 
And since WMA in Barbee "timely paid the arbitration award," the plaintiffs were "not entitled 
to file a separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees." !d. In the present case, unlike in Barbee, the 
cases "interpreting I. C. § 41-183 9" need not be applied "by analogy"-rather direct application 
of those cases based on the same statutory provision is appropriate. !d. 
The Ferrells' arguments are flawed: While there may not be an express statement that 
says "Martin is hereby overruled," that portion of Martin that is now relied on by the Ferrells has 
been discussed and refuted by a subsequent Idaho Supreme Court ruling. Accordingly, it is no 
longer valid law, it is not binding, and it demonstrates that the District Court was correct in its 
initial ruling. 
In addition to Barbee, the Grease Spot decision went even further in its rejection of the 
Ferrells' Martin-based arguments. Grease Spot, 226 P.3d at 526-30. The District Court initially 
found it unnecessary to address Grease Spot at any length stating: "Even if this Court ignores 
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Grease Spot, under the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of pre-amended § 41-1839 as stated 
in Barbee, [United Financial] would not have been subject to the mandatory fee provision of§ 
41-1839 for fees incurred in arbitration." R. p. 115 (brackets added to properly name 
Respondent). Nevertheless, it is evident that Grease Spot reinforces the conclusion that the 
referenced language from Martin cannot be relied on. Grease Spot states as follows: 
[T]he plain text of I. C. § 41-183 9 is at odds with this Court's prior 
readings of the statute. Section 41-1839 only permits insureds to 
collect attorney fees incurred in a civil "action" to recover under an 
insurance policy. When a court compels arbitration, it often stays 
litigation as to all parties, regardless of whether they are to 
participate in the arbitration, to allow these corollary proceedings 
to be completed. An arbitration is not part of a civil action, but 
rather a proceeding separate and apart from litigation based on a 
contract between the parties. Further, there is no language 
indicating that § 41-1839 is meant to imply a provision for 
arbitration attorney fees into every insurance policy. Emery was 
therefore manifestly incorrect in holding to the contrary. To the 
extent that Emery implied into insurance policies a provision 
granting insureds arbitration attorney fees, it is expressly 
overruled. 
226 P.3d at 528 (see also Wo?fe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,405,913 P.2d 1168, 
1175 (1996) ("before an insured can recover attorney fees under the statute [LC. § 41 1839], an 
action in court must be brought to recover under the terms of the insurance policy"). Simply 
stated, even if Martin survived Barbee, the Supreme Court's unequivocal statements in Grease 
Spot demonstrate that Martin is not controlling law on this issue. 
The District Court properly denied attorney fees because the Barbee analysis replaced 
Martin. The District Court properly recognizing that Barbee is more recent, addresses the issue 
more directly, and is the relevant and controlling precedent. 
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3. The Ferrells misconstrue Unity Light & Power and Diace/ Chemical. 
The Ferrells' brief disregards the factual case contexts when it pulls language from Unity 
Light & Power v. Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720 (1968); and State ex Ref Wasden v. Diacel 
Chemical Industries, 141 Idaho 102, 106 P.3d 428, (2005). A. Brief p. 11-13. The Ferrells 
attempt to use limited language from these cases to argue that this Court should apply§ 41-1839 
as such existed in November 2010 (i.e., when the Ferrells filed a request with the District Court 
to confirm the arbitration award). Significantly however, neither Unity Light & Power, nor 
Diacel Chemical involved arbitration. See Unity Light & Power, 92 Idaho at 501 ("Unity 
instituted the present action ... "; text search shows no reference to arbitration); Diacel Chemical, 
141 Idaho at 104 ("On January 6, 2003, the State filed this action ... "; text search shows no 
reference to arbitration). Because there was no arbitration involved in these cases, when the 
Supreme Court made pronouncements about what was controlling law, it did so in the context of 
state court litigation being the only forum and proceeding. 
It is an immense stretch of the statements and rationale found in Unity Light & Power and 
in Diacel Chemical for the Ferrells to now argue that their own initiation of arbitration, and 
indeed the whole arbitration process, should be disregarded in considering the controlling law. If 
courts accepted such rationale, it would create considerable confusion and preclude a defendant 
from understanding what law would ultimately control a pending dispute. 
The District Court appropriately considered and applied the rulings of Unity Light & 
Power and Diacel Chemical. Those decisions stand for the principle that the law existing at the 
commencement of an action should be controlling throughout the course of the proceeding. R. p. 
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180. United Financial agrees and again asserts that the proceeding commenced when arbitration 
was initiated. 
The Ferrells' brief also cites Overman v. Overman, 102 Idaho 235,629 P.2d 127 (1980). 
A. Briefp. 12. Overman is a divorce/child custody case. United Financial is unable to determine 
the relevance or why such case is being cited. According to the Overman court: 
The question presented by this appeal is a narrow one, i.e., whether 
the district court, on the non-custodial parent's motion to modify 
the child custody decree, erred in entering an order granting 
temporary custody of the minor children to the non-custodial 
parent upon a properly supported ex parte motion pending a full 
hearing, to be held within ten days. 
102 Idaho at 237, 629 P.2d at 129. United Financial has not found language in Overman that 
seems to pertain to the present matter (there is no page-specific reference in the cite included 
the Ferrells' briefing). Accordingly, United Financial does not believe that Overman has 
applicability or that it supports the Ferrells' arguments. 
4. The Ferrells' request to confirm an arbitration award is not an action in 
court sufficient to recover attorney fees under§ 41-1839. 
The Ferrells' action before the District Court was allegedly to "confirm the arbitration 
award." However, the Ferrells' pleadings and motions have obviously focused on pursuing 
attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that a post-arbitration request to 
confirm an award does not suffice as a basis to recover attorney fees under LC. § 41-1839~ 
In Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168 (1996), the court 
explains and rules as follows: 
Wolfe argues that he is entitled to attorney fees incurred during 
arbitration under his motion to the district court for confirmation of 
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the arbitration award. Wolfe contends that when an insured is 
required to enter into arbitration under his insurance contract, due 
to his insurance company's failure to pay what is justly due, then 
he is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 41-1839. Wolfe 
cites Emery and Walton v Hartford Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 616, 818 
P.2d 320 (1991), as authority for his argument. We disagree with 
Wolfe's assertions. Neither Emery nor Walton is helpful or 
instructive to the resolution of the present case. 
Idaho Code 41-1839 provides for the award of attorney fees if the 
insurance company fails to pay an amount justly due under the 
policy within thirty days after proof of loss. But, before an insured 
can recover attorney fees under the statute, an action in court must 
be brought to recover under the terms of the insurance policy. I. C. 
§ 41-1839; see Pendlebury v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 89 
Idaho 456, 465, 406 P.2d 129, 134 (1965) ("An insurer which fails 
for a period of thirty days after proof of loss to pay the person 
entitled thereto the amount justly due under the policy, shall in any 
action thereafter pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge 
reasonable as attorney's fees in such action."). In both Emery and 
Walton, suits were filed in court prior to arbitration, which brought 
those cases squarely within the purview of I.C. § 41-1839. In the 
present case, a motion for confirmation of an arbitration award is 
being used as a vehicle to assert a claim for attorney fees where no 
prior court action was filed. 
No Idaho Supreme Court case has previously addressed the issue 
of whether a motion for confirmation of an arbitration award 
constitutes an action in court to recover attorney fees incurred in 
arbitration under I.C. § 41-1839 .... 
* * * 
On its face Idaho Code§ 41-1839 requires that an action in court 
be filed. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that "[t]here 
shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action."' I.R.C.P. 
2; see also Idaho Const. art. V, § 1. Rule 3(a) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires that a civil action commence with the 
filing of a complaint, petition, or application with the court and 
that no dispute may be submitted to the court without the filing of 
a complaint, petition, or application. I.R.C.P. 3(a). A confirmation 
application is presented to the court through a motion or 
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application for the purpose of confirming an arbitration award. An 
application seeking the confirmation of an arbitration award is not 
an action in court to recover attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 41-
1839. Wolfe filed a motion for confirmation of arbitration award, 
pursuant to I. C. § 7-911, seeking attorney fees. Because the 
confirmation motion is not an action in court pursuant to I. C. § 41-
1839, Wolfe is not entitled to attorney fees. 
128 Idaho at 403-04, 405, 913 P.2d at 1173-74, 1175 (underlined emphasis added). 
In addition to strengthening the other arguments asserted by United Financial, Wo(fe 
makes it clear that the Ferrells have no basis to obtain attorney fees via a post-arbitration 
proceeding that is only being brought to "confirm" the arbitration award. Since this is exactly 
what the Ferrells are attempting to do, this Court should sustain both of the District Court's 
rulings and again deny any award of attorney fees in accordance with Wo(fe. R. pp. 107 and 177. 
5. Because United Financial has already paid the arbitration award, the 
present proceeding is moot. 
There is another issue that becomes evident in reviewing the cases cited by both parties 
and previously relied on by the Court: This proceeding is moot because United Financial acted 
promptly to pay the arbitration award soon after such was issued. R. p. 148. Idaho courts have 
stated that confirmation of an arbitration award is only needed if it is necessary to convert such 
to a judgment for future collection efforts. See Bingham County Com 'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 
108 Idaho 181, 183, 697 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Idaho App. 1985)("Such an award requires the 
imprimatur of a court to be enforced."). Here the award is already paid-meaning that a 
judgment is unnecessary, confirmation is meaningless, and this proceeding is therefore moot. 
Barbee is again instructive: 
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Here, WMA timely paid the arbitration award [WMA was 
the party against whom the arbitration award was issued]. 
The Bentleys [the plaintiffs] were not involved in a lawsuit 
before they received their damages from WMA. 
Consequently, to the extent cases interpreting LC. § 41-
1839 apply by analogy, the Bentleys are not entitled to file 
a separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees. 
146 P.3d at 661 (bracketed language added to identify the involved entities). 
In the present case, United Financial acted promptly to pay the full amount of the 
arbitration award. Checks were immediately requested, timely processed, and United Financial's 
counsel forwarded such on November 19, 2010 (only two weeks after the award was issued). R. 
p. 151-54. Notwithstanding this prompt timing, and with the understanding that checks were 
being issued, the Ferrells submitted their initial Petition with the District Court on November 16, 
2010 (however, the Petition was received by United Financial's counsel after payment was 
issued and received by the Ferrells). R. p. 149. 
Because United Financial "timely paid the arbitration award," the Ferrells need not have 
been "involved in a lawsuit before they received their damages." Barbee, 146 P.3d at 661. 
Hence, the Ferrells' lawsuit effectively seeking "solely attorney fees" is unnecessary and moot 
I d. 
B. The District Court properly overturned its previous award of costs. 
1. The Ferrells' incorrectly focus on rule 54 as determinative. 
The Ferrells' brief asserts that LR.C.P. Rule 54 is controlling. A. Briefp. 17-19. 
However, courts in Idaho and elsewhere have made it clear that such a civil rule provision will 
not override the parties' arbitration agreement or the provisions ofthe Uniform Arbitration Act 
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LC. §§ 7-901 through 7-922. Because the arbitration agreement and the UAA do not warrant the 
shifting of costs, the focus on Civil Rule 54 is unhelpful. 
For example, in 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court favorably cited a New Jersey case which 
addressed the interaction between arbitration and civil rule cost shifting provisions. The New 
Jersey case stated as follows: 
This court holds that the provisions of R. 4:42-8 [New Jersey civil 
rule] providing for an award of costs in favor of a prevailing party 
are not intended to apply to proceedings resolved through the 
confirmation of an arbitrator's award arising out of mandatory 
non-binding arbitration conducted pursuant to R. 4:21A-1, unless 
such a claim is specifically preserved in the arbitrator's award. 
See Greenfield v. Caesar's Atlantic City Hotel/Casino, 334 N.J. Super. 149, 756 A.2d 1096, 
1102 (Law Div. 2000) (underlined emphasis added; bracketed explanatory language added) 
(cited in Grease Spot. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in Grease Spot: "a general fee-shifting 
statute did not control over the specific UAA provision." !d. 226 P.3d at 529. (citing Canon Sch. 
Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Canst. Co., 180 Ariz. 148, 882 P.2d 1274, 1279-80 (1994)). 
Pursuant to this case law, the applicable statute is the Uniform Arbitration Act, the 
controlling document is the parties' arbitration agreement, and Civil Rule 54 does not preempt 
these provisions. The UAA simply requires deference to an existing arbitration agreement. This 
Court should therefore recognize and defer to the cost provision contained in the arbitration 
agreement. The relevant portion of the insurance policy provides: 
R. p. 097. 
"Each party will pay the costs and fees of its arbitrator and any 
other expenses it incurs. The costs and fees of the third arbitrator 
will be shared equally." 
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The Ferrells' brief attempts to limit the application of the Grease Spot decision by 
arguing that this case was decided after arbitration began and was overruled by statute. A. Brief 
p. 19. The brief then cites Emery and § 41-1839 as the relevant authority and that their arguments 
regarding attorney fees should be analogously applied to Rule 54. A. Brief p. 19. However, the 
law regarding costs was the same at the time the Ferrells demanded arbitration and when they 
filed suit. The Arbitration Clause of the insurance policy was ever present and the UAA was in 
force during all relevant times. While Grease Spot has been limited in the application of attorney 
fees in arbitration, the legislature did not amend § 41-1839 to include costs or overturn Grease 
Spot as a whole. See§ 41-1839(1)(as effective July 1, 2010). Grease Spot provided clarity to 
law regarding costs as it existed before and after the commencement of these proceedings. 226 
P.3d at 529. 
The Ferrells' reliance on Civil Rule 54 is misplaced because of the UAA, the favorable 
case law, and the explicit language in the Arbitration Clause. Accordingly, there was no 
"waiver" of any objection pursuant to Rule 54 because that rule is not controlling. Similarly, 
discussion of"prevailing party" is unhelpful because of the explicit contractual arbitration 
document. Accordingly, the District Court properly determined that the parties are to bear 
own cost. 
2. The Arbitration Clause contained in the policy was exercised by the 
Ferrells and is controlling. 
The Ferrells initiated this proceeding to confirm an arbitration award. R. p. 006. The 
award arose from the parties' previously existing agreement to apply the Arbitration Clause of 
the insurance policy. The Ferrells filed their Petition in the District Court citing the Arbitration 
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Clause. R. p. 008, L. 15-16. The Ferrells went even further in referencing the UAA as the 
statutory framework under which their action arose. R. p. 009, L. 18-19. The Ferrells conceded 
that the Arbitration Clause provided the procedures and relief they were seeking to confirm. 
However, the Ferrells did not provide the District Court with a copy of the insurance policy with 
the Arbitration Clause. 
Furthermore, when the Ferrells filed their Motion for Fees and Costs, they did not cite the 
Arbitration Clause as the authority governing reliefbecause it did not grant them all of the costs 
they were requesting. R. p. 040. Subsequently, the Ferrells asked the District Court to disregard 
the Arbitration Clause because they believed Rule 54 should be the authority regarding costs. 
p. 156. The underlying arbitration agreement was provided to the Court and was relied on by 
United Financial's counsel at the initial hearing. R. p. 088; Tr. p. 33, L. 8-16. There was no 
objection raised by the Ferrells' counsel when such was submitted, and the District Court 
indicated that such would be considered in its decision. Tr. p. 39, L. 16-20. The Ferrelk' 
that they objected to the court considering the Arbitration Clause by citing a discussion held 
the record. A. Briefp. 18, footnote 2. 
The Ferrells were afforded an opportunity to file an objection to the submission and 
consideration of the Arbitration Clause. Tr. p. 39, L. 25; p. 40, L. 1-2. They filed their Objection 
to Affidavit of Defendants' Counsel on April 11, 2011. R. p. 098. This filing and all subsequent 
filings, including the Ferrells' Appellant's Brief, object to the timeliness of bringing the 
Arbitration Clause to the District Courts attention, and not whether it is the binding authority. 
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When the issue of costs was being reconsidered by the District Court, the Ferrells had 
opportunity to present their objections to the application of the Arbitration Clause. Again, the 
Ferrells relied on Rule 54 as a shield against the Arbitration Clause. Tr. p. 48, L. 4-19. 
The District Court determined that§ 7-910 provides the necessary instruction: 
"Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the 
arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not 
including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, 
shall be paid as provided in the award." 
R. p. 184 (Emphasis added). The District Court's ruling denying costs was correct because the 
statute clearly provides that the Arbitration Clause properly controls the issue of costs. 
The Ferrells have benefitted from the Arbitration Clause. Based on such, they obtained an 
award which has been paid. Accordingly, the Ferrells ought to be subject to all of the provisions 
specified in the agreement. As cited above, this means that costs cannot be shifted to the V'""'""' 
Financial. This Court should uphold the District Court's ruling regarding costs to accord with 
the parties' arbitration agreement, the Uniform Arbitration Act, and the cited case law. 
C. Attorney fees and cost on appeal. 
The Ferrells have requested attorney fees and costs on appeal in their brief. A. Brief p.19. 
The same arguments expressed above apply equally to the Ferrel]s' request for attorney fees on 
appeal. 
Furthermore, Rule 35(a)(5) of the Idaho Appellate Rules states: 
Attorney Fees on AppeaL If the appellant is claiming attorney fees 
on appeal the appellant must so indicate in the division of issues 
on appeal that appellant is claiming attorney fees and state the 
basis for the claim. (emphasis added) 
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The F errells' brief does have a section listed as issues on appeal. A. Brief p. 7. This 
section regarding issues on appeal does not include a request for attorney fees on appeal as 
required by the above rule. The Ferrells' request for attorney fees on appeal should be denied 
because they have failed to properly plead their requests under Rule 35(a)(5) of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. United Financial requests the Ferrells' request for attorney fees and costs 
appeal be denied. 
V. CONCLUSION 
According to the foregoing arguments, This Court should hold that the District Court 
properly determined that the Ferrells are not entitled to attorney fees under§ 41-1839 and the 
parties are to bear the burden of their own costs pursuant to Arbitration Clause of the insurance 
policy. 
DATED thisdJday of March 2012. 
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